Nope. A month or two in, they loosened the amount of ethanol allowed in per gallon of gasoline. This also burns faster and is worse for your engine. Look up summertime E15 sales.

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Send it to its retirement home in the balkans, gramps will fix the tires for two packs of ciggies and a shot of vodka

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2 out of the 7 satellites that ASTS launched in the last two years appear to be duds, that's a 30% failure rate. Even their paid propagandists are starting to make excuses. Management is completely silent. When they have to file that disclosure, look for the stock to drop 50% overnight.

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Made $800 on UMC calls I bought yesterday, spent $700 at Marshall’s just now. Best selection I’ve seen in the past like two years. Every rack was a banger.

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Two in the pink, one in the stink

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Experts commissioned by the U.N.’s top human rights body say they have found “reasonable grounds” to believe the United States committed war crimes in two strikes in Iran

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I swear if any of you ever tells me the market is not rigged and efficient $SPCX is still > 2T. two fucking trillion dollars. 2000 billions, 250billions more than META. 8B revenue,-500M loss last quarter. LMAO 🤌 # 🎪🎪🎪🤡🤡🤡 🤡🤡🤡

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hmmm okay so two things that have already been known for a while… yeah prolly a solid 3-5% drop tmrw thanks dawg

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One thing I think is missing from this discussion is that Brazil has already been through an earlier wave of Chinese automakers, and it shows that being Chinese, having lower manufacturing costs or offering more equipment does not automatically guarantee success. Chery entered Brazil in 2009, long before the current EV boom. Its first attempt was not particularly successful. The cars could offer a lot of equipment for the money, but the products, powertrains, dealer experience and overall strategy were not yet sufficiently adapted to Brazilian conditions and consumer expectations. Several early models disappeared. But Chery stayed. It built a factory, accumulated experience and eventually partnered with CAOA, a Brazilian automotive group with decades of experience in the local industry. CAOA had previously built its business through Ford dealerships, imported Hyundai vehicles and eventually manufactured Hyundai vehicles in Brazil. The result is that today's CAOA Chery is almost unrecognizable compared with the Chery that entered Brazil more than 15 years ago. And now CAOA is doing something similar with Changan. Changan is a separate Chinese automaker, but CAOA is using its Brazilian industrial and commercial infrastructure to manufacture and sell Changan products here as CAOA Changan. That is important because this competition is no longer limited to cheap imported EVs. Chinese-designed ICE, mild-hybrid, hybrid and plug-in hybrid vehicles are increasingly competing with traditional manufacturers too. JAC is a useful counterexample because its history went almost in the opposite direction. JAC entered Brazil in 2011 with a huge marketing campaign, quickly established a large dealer network and initially sold quite well. It promised Brazilian manufacturing, but that passenger-car factory never materialized. Over time its light-vehicle operation shrank dramatically and most of that original dealer footprint disappeared. So Brazil has already demonstrated something important: Chinese origin alone doesn't guarantee success. Chery initially struggled, stayed, learned, localized and found a strong Brazilian industrial partner. JAC had a much stronger initial launch but failed to establish the same industrial footprint and eventually became a much smaller player. Now we're watching a much larger second wave. BYD took over Ford's former industrial complex in Camaçari. GWM took over Mercedes-Benz's former factory in Iracemápolis. Renault and Geely are expanding their industrial relationship. GM itself is assembling Chinese-developed Chevrolet EVs in Ceará through products originating from its Chinese ecosystem with SAIC and Wuling. Toyota and BYD have a 50/50 EV R&D joint venture. Tesla complicates the story even further. Tesla is one of America's biggest automotive technology success stories, but its battery supply chain has always been international. Panasonic was fundamental to its early scale, while its later battery sourcing expanded to suppliers including LG Energy Solution and CATL. So the modern auto industry is already much more interconnected than “Chinese technology vs American technology” suggests. And this is why I find the comparison with Japanese and Korean automakers so interesting. Foreign manufacturers don't necessarily remain importers forever. They enter a market. Sometimes they fail. Sometimes they learn. They change products, establish dealerships, find local suppliers, partner with domestic companies, hire local engineers and workers, and eventually manufacture locally. Brazil watched Japanese and Korean companies go through versions of that process. Now we're watching Chinese companies do it. And localization gives us a much better experiment for the question this thread started with. If BYD, GWM, Changan or another Chinese manufacturer loses most of its price advantage after producing in Brazil, Europe or eventually the US with local workers and local regulations, then Chinese wages, subsidies and domestic production conditions were clearly responsible for a large part of that advantage. But if a significant advantage survives localization, then wages cannot be the whole explanation. Battery costs, vertical integration, platform architecture, supplier organization, procurement, automation, manufacturing scale, development cycles and margins all become part of the answer. That's why I don't think the most interesting experiment is simply importing millions of Chinese cars into the US. Make them manufacture there. Make them employ American workers. Make them comply with American safety, labor and environmental rules. Then compare the products. Brazil is increasingly doing exactly that experiment with Brazilian workers. And after watching what happened with Chery and JAC over the last 15+ years, I wouldn't assume the result in advance. Localization can expose weaknesses just as easily as it can expose advantages.

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There is another part of this discussion that makes the whole “Chinese auto industry vs American auto industry” framing much less clean than it sounds. Tesla itself is a good example. Tesla is American, but its battery supply chain has never been purely American. Panasonic was crucial to Tesla’s early scale, and Tesla later diversified its battery sourcing to companies including LG Energy Solution and CATL. So even the most successful American pure-EV manufacturer was built around a global, heavily Asian battery supply chain. Brazil makes this even more interesting because we are watching several versions of this industrial integration happen at the same time. BYD took over Ford’s former industrial complex in Camaçari and is progressively localizing production. GWM took over Mercedes-Benz’s former factory in Iracemápolis. Renault and Geely are expanding their industrial relationship in Brazil. GM itself is now assembling Chinese-developed Chevrolet EVs in Ceará. The Spark EUV and Captiva EV come from GM’s Chinese industrial ecosystem with SAIC and Wuling and are being assembled locally. Toyota and BYD have a 50/50 EV R&D joint venture. Nissan has had a major industrial relationship with Dongfeng in China for decades. At some point, asking whether a technology is simply “Chinese” or “Western” stops having an easy answer. And Brazil gives us another interesting experiment: range. If you look only at Brazilian homologation figures, some EVs can look surprisingly short-legged. Cars with batteries in the 50-60 kWh range can receive official Inmetro/PBEV range figures around 300 km. But the Brazilian number is deliberately conservative. Inmetro does not simply publish the raw laboratory result. Adjustment factors are applied to produce a more conservative real-world reference. The problem is that a lot of automotive discussion here then treats that number almost as the maximum distance the EV can realistically travel. Owner experience often looks very different. We now have EV owners driving these cars across Brazil, including mountainous areas and routes that climb from the coast onto the plateau. There are owners and independent tests substantially exceeding the official Inmetro range, and under favorable conditions some results get much closer to WLTP. Larger-battery EVs can exceed 400 km in real use even when their Brazilian homologated number looks much less impressive. Obviously that does not mean WLTP is guaranteed real-world range. Drive at 120 km/h, climb continuously, add headwind, temperature changes or heavy HVAC use and consumption changes dramatically. But this exposes an interesting asymmetry in how cars are discussed here. When a small 1.0-liter ICE car achieves an exceptionally good km/l result, automotive enthusiasts and media are perfectly happy to show what the car can achieve under favorable real-world conditions. With EVs, I often see the opposite. The conservative Inmetro figure gets repeated as the defining range of the vehicle, while owner consumption and independent road results receive much less attention. A much better way to discuss EV range is to show the homologation numbers and then show actual energy consumption. If an EV does 12, 15, 18 or 22 kWh/100 km, anyone can understand what a 40, 60 or 90 kWh battery means under different conditions. That's much more informative than saying “this is a 300 km car” because one homologation system printed 300 km on the label. And all of this comes back to the original Detroit question. Brazil is becoming a useful real-world laboratory because Chinese manufacturers are no longer simply shipping Chinese-built cars here. They are buying former Western factories, hiring Brazilian workers and progressively localizing production. At the same time, established American, European and Japanese manufacturers are increasingly using Chinese partners, platforms, batteries, engineering or complete vehicles. Europe is moving in a similar direction as Chinese manufacturers localize more production there. That gives us an opportunity to separate two things that are constantly mixed together in this discussion. If Chinese manufacturers lose most of their price advantage when they manufacture in Brazil, Europe or eventually the US with local workers, then Chinese wages, subsidies and domestic production conditions were clearly doing much of the work. But if a substantial advantage survives localization, then wages cannot be the entire explanation. Battery costs, vertical integration, EV-specific platforms, supplier organization, procurement, manufacturing scale, automation, development cycles and margins all have to enter the discussion. That's why I would actually find an American-built Chinese EV much more interesting than another imported Chinese EV. Require American production. American wages. American safety and environmental standards. Apply the same rules to everyone. Then compare the products. If an American-built BYD ends up costing roughly the same as an equivalent American-built GM or Ford, we learn something important about where the original Chinese cost advantage came from. But if it can still compete aggressively on price, equipment and efficiency while paying American production costs, then tariffs didn't answer the underlying competitiveness question. They only delayed the experiment.

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